It’s time for another Iran update. I think a lot of people expected this whole thing to be done by now. While I understand that, it’s important to remember that we’ve completely upended a major regional power’s leadership and hamstrung its military capability. We can’t even say for sure what the nation’s leadership structure looks like right now. In many cases, the Iranians probably don’t even know. Using terms like “bogged down” and “quagmire” is a little premature when it hasn’t even been 60 days. (We spent about 10 years of direct combat in Vietnam and then 20 years in Afghanistan.)

When your nation’s leadership has been decapitated, there’s going to be a struggle between multiple entities to fill that vacuum. I’m sure everyone over there was initially filled with fury and rage, but that emotion settles down a lot faster for some than it does for others. Unfortunately, in Iran, those who propose discussions with the U.S. are probably seen as weak or lacking resolve, and are marginalized as much as possible. Those people need to somehow prevail within the rubble of their own government if we’re going to talk with them, otherwise the only people left are the violent hardliners.
On top of that, the country has prepared for this. Iran’s always known it can’t stand toe-to-toe with the U.S. and win a direct military confrontation. What it’s done instead is prepare to inflict as much pain as possible in a variety of ways. Its three main pillars of “sticking it to the West” are the use of proxies, employing decentralized execution, and exploiting the Strait of Hormuz.
First we’ll look at the proxies. Up until recently, Iran was the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism. The Iranian Government wasn’t willing to start wars with the U.S. or Israel, but it funded and supplied organizations willing to use guerilla tactics against Israel and the United States. If you follow the money, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis are all heavily supported by Iran. All three of those groups have committed acts of violence against the U.S. and/or Israel. Israel is geographically closer to the area, so it’s had to deal with that type of violence (and incoming ballistic missiles) much more extensively than we have here in the States. (I’d liken it to Israel living in a pretty rough neighborhood; not only does it have a shotgun and a pistol at home, it carries a blackjack, a shiv, and brass knuckles, and goes out looking for ways to send a message.) Iran’s backing of proxy groups allows it to inflict pain on its enemies without directly engaging them.
Iran also uses decentralized execution. Since its government knew its power was concentrated in a small number of officials at the top, it prepared itself for the possibility of a decapitation strike. In the event its top leadership was to ever be removed, it probably had standing orders to implement wartime plans. Iran’s long known it needed to fight on two fronts: external threats (militaries from other nations) and internal threats (an uprising among the Iranian people). To address the exterior threat, it formed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), more or less the elite branch of the military sworn to protect the Ayatollah and the Theocracy. For the internal threat, the Basij (think “secret police”) keep the people living in fear, putting down protests, arresting opposition members, executing protesters, etc. These two groups have both been taught to carry on even if their leadership is killed or otherwise removed from their positions. That’s what we’ve seen since the start of the war; the U.S./Israel coalition took out many of Iran’s rocket launchers and drone launchers, but the lower-level Iranian commanders got smart about how to use the stuff they still had left. When they launched attacks immediately before the cease fire, they used “shoot and scoot” tactics which make it tough for us to eliminate that equipment. While no longer effective at scale, they’re doing about as good a job as they can shooting at foreign targets without having a command structure. Similarly, Iran’s citizens have a hard time organizing an effective uprising when they have no phone or internet connections and there’s essentially a neighborhood watch keeping an eye on them, reporting the formation of opposition groups.
And finally, there’s the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian Government is militarily weak right now, but it’s not stupid. The Strait of Hormuz is its major remaining piece of leverage, and it’s a big one. It knows that once it gives up that leverage, it has almost no bargaining chips left. Iran’s leadership doesn’t have to worry about polling, but it knows politicians here in the U.S. do. Whoever’s in charge over there knows that if they can drag things out long enough, our own political will to continue the conflict will die. This wasn’t a war the American people were ever clamoring for; we just woke up one day and found we were in this conflict. Accordingly, it will take less time for Americans to truly sour on the war. The current Iranian Government knows it can’t win, but if it can just hang on long enough for Americans to demand an end to the conflict, it will walk away from it with more favorable circumstances than if it gave up control of the Strait right away. Four dollar a gallon gasoline is painful for Americans, and when it persists, those prices start showing up in a lot more areas of the economy than simply at the gas pump. The longer this goes, the worse it’s going to get for the party in power here in the States. Iran’s Government knows that, and will likely drag out its resistance as long as possible to affect public opinion and thus pressure American politicians. The hope would be the U.S. offers more and larger concessions to sweeten the pot for the sake of ending the conflict sooner.
We gave the Iranian people the opportunity to rise up and overthrow their government. As near as we can tell, they haven’t taken it. We can try to create the conditions that would be ripe for an uprising, but we can’t force them to take action. The ideal scenario would be to have the people rise up against their leaders, overthrow the Basij and the IRGC, and work with the United States to set up a new government that works to become a productive member of the international community. That does not appear to be an imminent possibility, however, so we’re stuck negotiating with the remnants of the last government.
Americans and the news media are largely impatient with this whole endeavor. What the public needs to understand is that when you’re working on something as significant as the dismantlement of the world’s chief sponsor of terror and permanent reduction of risk in the Strait of Hormuz, it’s something worth patience and being willing to take the time to get right, rather than rushing to get a hasty and incomplete settlement. Whoever’s representing Iran at the negotiations may not even have full control over what all the IRGC and Basij commanders are doing, so it’s perfectly understandable (though less and less tolerable) if small numbers of one-way drone or missile launches take place.
Hang in there. The problem’s being worked, but don’t be surprised when the President doesn’t fully inform the news media of his negotiation strategy. If they know, Iran knows.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































